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Access of Evil? Legislating Online Youth
Privacy in the Information Age
Agathon Fric*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has become so common to hear youth advocates plead, “Won’t somebody
think of the children?” that the question is now often invoked derisively. The ques-
tion connotes children’s powerlessness in making decisions that directly affect
them, with the implication being that children are in need of protection from some
new evil that threatens their innocence. Consider this: in October 2013, the second
most-trafficked website on the Internet, Facebook.com, announced that opening its
social network to users under the age of 13 is something it seriously considers.1
Youth advocates balked at the mere suggestion that tweens — those between child-
hood and adolescence who are not yet teenagers — might be exposed to the privacy
risks posed by sharing their personal information online. However, it is not just
Facebook that raises the ire of privacy groups. In fact, a 2013 study by the Pew
Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project, jointly conducted with re-
searchers at Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society, suggests
that Facebook is losing clout among today’s teens.2 No longer considered as “cool”
as it once was, hundreds of new mobile applications or “apps” targeting the under-
18 demographic have emerged in its wake. For example, Snapchat is one of the
fastest-growing apps among youth. The company’s logo features a ghost, alluding
to Snapchat’s claim that photos posted by users on the service will automatically
“disappear” after the intended recipients view the photos for one to ten seconds.
Snapchat explains its philosophy in its Guide for Parents: 
On traditional social networks, users [. . .] feel pressure to curate the perfect
representation of their lives for their friends . . . It’s normal to worry about
what people in your network might think about the things that you post.
Sometimes this means that we say things that we think people will like,
rather than expressing who we really are.
* Agathon Fric is a Juris Doctor candidate at Dalhousie University’s Schulich School of
Law and holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Political Science from Carleton
University. He wishes to thank Professor Elizabeth Hughes for introducing him to
privacy law as it relates to youth, for her infectious enthusiasm, and for her endless
encouragement. Agathon’s essay, here reproduced, is the 2014 winner of the IT.Can
Student Writing Contest, a prize he accepted at the 18th Annual Canadian IT Law
Association Conference in Montreal.
1 Anton Troianovski & Shayndi Raice, “Facebook Explores Giving Kids Access”, The
Wall Street Journal (4 June 2012) online: WSJ <http://online.wsj.com>.
2 Mary Madden et al, “Teens, Social Media, and Privacy” (Washington, DC: Pew Re-
search Center, 2013) at 2, online: Pew Internet & American Life Project
<http://www.pewinternet.org>.
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Snapchat creates a place to be funny, honest or however else you might feel
when you take and share a snap with family and friends. It’s sharing that
lives in the moment, and stays in the moment.3
Yet, despite marketing itself as a place where youth can be honest without fear of
repercussion, Snapchat’s privacy policy tells a different, and more accurate, story: 
We cannot guarantee that deletion always occurs within a particular
timeframe. We also cannot prevent others from making copies of your
Snaps (e.g., by taking a screenshot). [. . .] In addition, as for any other digi-
tal information, there may be ways to access Snaps while still in temporary
storage on recipients’ devices or, forensically, even after they are deleted.
You should not use Snapchat to send messages if you want to be certain that
the recipient cannot keep a copy.4
The ghost is therefore an appropriate icon for Snapchat, not because the photos
posted to it are actually ephemeral, but because the “Snaps” might never fade away
and youth could be haunted by them for years to come. Saying one thing and doing
another is not a new phenomenon; however, inducing youth to register for a web-
site and surrender their personal information without knowing what they are getting
into poses a problem.
The particular developmental challenges of youth make them vulnerable to
privacy invasions online that capitalize on their credulity and commoditize their
personal information in ways that are not always readily apparent and with poten-
tial consequences that are still less understood. The current legal regime in which
private organizations collect, use, and disclose the personal information of Cana-
dian youth for commercial purposes has advantages and disadvantages. However,
proposals for reform have so far myopically focused on tinkering with the existing
consent-based model of informational privacy, which ignores youth’s own chang-
ing expectations of privacy. This suggests that in seeking to “protect” youth’s pri-
vacy online, legislators have disempowered children and their parents from deter-
mining what information practices are acceptable for them. The law should instead
respect these choices, while providing families with the tools necessary to exercise
them.
(a) Method
This article seeks to address what constitutes youth online privacy, how youth
conceive of their privacy, whether their privacy needs protecting, and, if so, how
youth privacy should be regulated online. First, the article begins by rooting the
issue of online youth privacy in the current social, technological, economic, politi-
cal, and legal context, drawing on social science research to demonstrate both the
threats and opportunities created by technology for youth privacy.
3 Snapchat, Guide for Parents, online: Snapchat
<http://www.snapchat.com/static_files/parents.pdf> [emphasis added]. After this article
was written, Snapchat tellingly revised the last line of its Guide for Parents on May 1,
2014 to read “It’s sharing that lives in the moment, unless some one decides to save it.”
4 Snapchat, Privacy Policy, online: Snapchat <http://www.snapchat.com/privacy> [em-
phasis added]. By the time of publication, Snapchat had replaced references to “Snaps”
with the broader, seemingly innocuous term “messages.”
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Second, the analysis focuses on the relative strengths and weaknesses of cur-
rent federal legislation as the primary law governing the collection, use, and disclo-
sure of youth’s personal information through their online activities, including their
use of social networks and mobile applications or “apps.” Under the Constitution
Act, 1867, privacy is not explicitly assigned to the provinces or the federal govern-
ment. Depending on the context, privacy may affect provincial domain over pro-
perty and civil rights, or the federal power over trade and commerce. However,
aside from British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec, which have passed “substan-
tially similar” legislation to the federal government, the federal statute applies to all
private organizations across the country that collect information in the course of a
commercial activity, even if they only carry on business in a single province.5 Prac-
tically speaking, to the extent commercial websites collect young people’s informa-
tion across interprovincial or international borders, they are going to be governed
by the federal statute, in recognition of the federal government’s power to regulate
interprovincial and international trade.6 It is worth noting that Canadian jurispru-
dence on youth privacy online is underdeveloped by virtue of the fact that the Of-
fice of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) generally diverts such griev-
ances from the judicial system. Even then, the Privacy Commissioner has so far
only conducted one investigation into a website that specifically targets youth.7 Ac-
cordingly, the Commissioner’s report into the complaint against Nexopia.com, a
Canadian-made social network, figures prominently in this analysis. It serves as a
case study of how federal privacy legislation is applied in practice, and an example
by which the effectiveness of the existing regime may be evaluated.
Third, after canvassing the shortcomings of the current legal regime, I con-
sider proposals for reform and assess their merits. This analysis draws on the legis-
lative experience of the United States, both as a possible model for reform and as a
cautionary tale. Given that many of the world’s most popular websites among
youth originate in the US, that country’s Congress has arguably had a greater influ-
ence on the information practices and privacy policies affecting Canadian youth
than any other. Finally, I offer an alternative legal solution to give more meaningful
expression to youth privacy rights, while avoiding the paradigmatic trap of most
existing proposals.
(b) Scope
Privacy law is a growing area of study. The sheer novelty of the Internet and
new means of invading privacy ensure that the timeworn construction of law as an
inherently reactive force will persist for some time to come. While this article is
5 Barbara McIsaac, Rich Shields & Kris Klein, The Law of Privacy in Canada, loose-leaf
(Scarborough, Ont: Carswell), ch 1 at 17.
6 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Your Privacy Responsibilities: A Guide
for Businesses and Organizations (February 2010) at 3, online: OPC
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide_e.pdf> [OPC, Guide for Businesses].
7 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA Report of Findings #2012-
001, “Social networking site for youth, Nexopia, breached Canadian privacy law” (29
February 2012) Introduction at para 11, online: OPC <http://www.priv.gc.ca> [OPC,
“Nexopia”].
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about youth privacy on the Internet, it is beyond the scope of the present analysis to
delve into all the ways in which the World Wide Web threatens the privacy of
youth. For instance, unsolicited or inadvertent access to pornographic and other
mature content may constitute an intrusion upon children’s privacy online, but this
type of privacy infringement is outside the current scope. By the same token, this
article is not, strictly speaking, about cyberbullying or other instances where youth
use technology to intentionally violate the privacy of other youth, although this too
is an increasingly common by-product of the collection, use, or disclosure of per-
sonal information by organizations when youth do not fully appreciate the potential
consequences of sharing their information online.8 Nor is this article about the col-
lection, use, and disclosure of personal information by governments or public agen-
cies, which are governed under a separate statutory regime.9 This article focuses on
youth privacy online from the perspective of privacy as information control. More
specifically, it is concerned with the information management practices of private
websites that collect, use, or disclose youth’s personal information for profit, as
regulated by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.10
It is also about the reasonable or unreasonable privacy expectations that modern
youth have over the information they share.
II. PRIVACY, THE INTERNET, AND YOUTH IN CONTEXT
Before evaluating the current legal environment in which Canadian youth find
their privacy protected or unprotected, as the case may be, it would be prudent to
describe briefly what is meant by privacy and to situate online privacy in the social,
economic, and legal context in which youth find themselves. Broadly speaking,
privacy describes the relationship between one’s self and others. What is “private”
is usually understood in contrast to what is “public.” Thus, information is central to
society’s modern understanding of privacy.11 Information about an individual —
whether that be his or her name, age, birthdate, location, phone number, gender,
race, Social Insurance Number, reputation, or favourite band — is no longer con-
sidered by many to be “private” if it becomes publicly available. At the same time,
sharing information with others, in itself, does not necessarily correlate with dimin-
ished privacy. Depending on who has access to the personal information and what
purposes they use it for, the information may remain private as between the two, or
three, or however many parties with which it is shared. In this sense, an invasion of
privacy occurs when one of the parties privy to the information collects, uses, or
discloses some or all of it for a purpose or in a manner with which the individual
8 For a comprehensive treatment of cyberbullying as a social phenomenon and its inter-
play with the law, see Shaheen Shariff, Cyber-bullying: Issues and solutions for the
school, the classroom, and the home (London: Routledge, 2008).
9 See Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21.
10 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5
[PIPEDA].
11 Bernard Richard, “There Ought To Be A Law: Protecting Children’s Online Privacy in
the 21st Century” (Paper delivered by the Working Group of Canadian Privacy Com-
missioners and Child Youth Advocates, 19 November 2009) at 5, online: Government
of New Brunswick <http://www.gnb.ca/0073/PDF/Children’sOnlinePrivacy-e.pdf>.
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whom the information is about did not agree. In other words, privacy is breached
when one loses control over his or her own information.12 Therefore, privacy is
best understood as a spectrum: how much privacy one has, and over what pieces of
information, depends on the extent to which the individual retains control over his
or her information.
(a) Society and Technology
The aggressive collection, use, and disclosure of young people’s information
on the Internet did not begin with the advent of social networks such as MySpace,
Facebook, and Twitter, but the proliferation of these websites has intensified con-
cerns among parents and privacy groups about the consequences of sharing mounds
of data over time. The information that these sites collect is highly sensitive. For
example, in 2013 researchers developed a model that accurately predicts the sexual
orientation of Facebook users in 88% of cases, and can differentiate between Cau-
casians and Blacks 95% of the time, using only a user’s Facebook “Likes,” which
are used to express a “positive association” with a particular brand, artist, public
figure, or social issue.13 Such tools could lead to serious invasions of privacy using
seemingly benign preferences that are publicly available by default. Few things are
as intensely personal and private as one’s sexual orientation. This demonstrates that
youth privacy online is not merely jeopardized by the information that youth think
they are sharing explicitly, but also by what can be inferred from their public dis-
closures. Such technology would make it easy for employers to stereotype job ap-
plicants and discriminate against them based on the information that they have
shared online. The fear, then, is that youth are not capable of judging the potential
consequences of their actions online. On the other hand, the study also reveals a
unique opportunity: social scientists can conduct more meaningful research using
wider data sets than ever before, making their findings more reliable and potentially
more relevant.
Youth privacy exists in a social context where children and teens feel pres-
sured to  participate  in online  forums. As  one teenager put  it, “If you’re not on
MySpace, you don’t exist.”14 A young person’s social network of choice may vary,
but the sentiment is the same. In this way, those youth who would rather not share
their information online due to personal reasons — or because they actually appre-
ciate the harm that can come from unauthorized intrusions into their privacy — risk
being ostracized by their peers if they withdraw from the online sphere. Thus, peer
pressure reinforces and normalizes the collection, use, and disclosure of youth’s
personal information by commercial websites that offer youth these social spaces.
12 Ibid.
13 Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, “Private Traits and Attributes Are
Predictable From Digital Records of Human Behaviour”, online: (2013) 110:15 Pro-
ceedings Nat’l Academy Sci Early Ed 5802 <http://www.pnas.org>.
14 Danah Boyd & Alice E Marwick, “Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Atti-
tudes, Practices, and Strategies” (Paper delivered at the Oxford Internet Institute, A
Decade in Internet Time: Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet and Society, 22
September 2011) at 8, online: SSRN <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1925128>.
146   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [12 C.J.L.T.]
Youth also have a selfish reason for sharing personal information about them-
selves with commercial websites. Privacy and especially one’s control over per-
sonal information is central to one’s self-image. In choosing what information to
selectively disclose, youth are able to shape both how they see themselves and how
others perceive them. In this sense, curating an online profile that discloses one’s
likes and dislikes, opinions, or beliefs is akin to changing hairstyles or wearing new
outfits. Focus groups have shown that youth release personal information online to
assert independence from parents, to interact with friends, and to experiment with
new identities.15 During adolescence, youth are still in the process of forming their
identities as young adults. The Internet makes it possible for youth to test different
ideas and presentations of themselves without the same commitment that would be
required of, for example, getting a tattoo to express the same. They can alter their
image simply by disclosing more or less, or different types of, information.
As a result, youth’s liberal disclosure of information on social networks has
led some to believe that teens do not care about their privacy. This is not true.16
However, it is true that parents are far more concerned than their children about the
effect that sharing information online has on their children’s privacy. In 2012, just
9% of American teens said they were “very concerned” and 31% were “somewhat
concerned” about their information being shared online or used by third party ad-
vertisers. By contrast, 81% of parents said they were “very” or “somewhat con-
cerned.”17 It is fair to assume a similar trend exists in Canada, where 99% of chil-
dren use the Internet regularly and 94% of youths’ top 50 favourite websites
collected information from them in 2007.18 That parents are more concerned is not
surprising. After all, it is a parent’s job to take care of his or her children and to
look out for their best interests. However, their concern is rooted in the particular
characteristics of modern Internet technologies. Information that private websites
collect can be aggregated, manipulated, repackaged, and resold more quickly and
more cheaply than ever before. Furthermore, information that youth post online is
characterized by its permanence and a potentially limitless audience.19
On the other hand, while youth feel pressure from friends to share personal
information online, society also has a general interest in surveillance. Historically,
society has been sceptical of people who claim a right to privacy. After all, if one
has nothing to hide, why would he or she need privacy? At the same time that
parents lament what they perceive to be their child’s loss of privacy online, they are
15 Valerie Steeves, Trevor Milford & Ashley Butts, Summary of Research on Youth On-
line Privacy (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 28 March 2010)
at 15.
16 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Eth-
ics, Privacy and Social Media in the Age of Big Data (April 2013) at 22–30 (Chair:
Pierre-Luc Dusseault) at 24.
17 Madden et al, supra note 2 at 10.
18 Jacquelyn Burkell, Anca Micheti & Valerie Steeves, “Broken Doors: Strategies for
Drafting Privacy Policies Kids Can Understand” (March 2007) at 9, online: On the
Identity Trail <http://www.idtrail.org/files/broken_doors_final_report.pdf>.
19 Shariff, supra note 8 at 33.
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often quick to rely on their child’s Internet activities as a means of surveillance.20
In this way, parents are complicit in violating their own child’s sense of privacy.
The collection, use, and disclosure of children’s personal information becomes both
a blessing and a curse, creating a disincentive for parents to discourage children
from sharing personal information online. Of course, this is not true of all parents
or those who are more trusting of their children, but stories of parents snooping in
their children’s rooms are not unusual. Online surveillance for socializing with
friends has the indirect effect of making it easier for parents to pry. Therefore, there
are strong pressures for society to collect and for youth to share personal informa-
tion, facilitated by new Internet technologies.
(b) Economy and Politics
The economic incentives to undermine youth privacy through the online col-
lection, use, and disclosure of children and teen’s personal information are tremen-
dous. In Canada, youth aged 9 to 14 spend over $1.9 billion annually and influence
another $20 billion in family purchases.21 Those numbers balloon when you add
the market power of teenagers between 15 and 17. Since children do not have the
same financial obligations as adults, this is almost entirely discretionary spending
that is up for grabs. With youth spending more and more time online and revealing
more personal information than ever before, advertisers have developed sophisti-
cated new ways to target youth. For example, through the use of online behavioural
advertising third parties can track a user’s activities online, including what links a
user clicks, what strings a user searches, and what products a user purchases.22
Taken together, this information enables advertisers to create a profile on a particu-
lar user’s preferences, which can then be used to display ads specifically tailored to
the unique user. By only advertising a particular product or service to users that
have a proven disposition toward that subject, online behavioural advertising is a
more effective marketing vehicle than traditional advertising, where dollars are
wasted on a mass of people who may never be interested in the thing being pro-
moted. Collecting youth’s information to target customers promises that businesses
will save money on advertising, sell more product, and increase the relevance of
advertising shown to youth.
A recent example illustrates the attractiveness of this model to big business. In
November 2013, Facebook offered to buy Snapchat for $3 billion USD, despite the
fact that Snapchat has never generated a penny of revenue.23 What Snapchat lacks
in profit, it more than makes up for with personal information, which buyers see as
a resource that has yet to be exploited. It is thus not surprising that Snapchat’s CEO
20 Boyd & Marwick, supra note 14 at 5.
21 Valerie Steeves, “It’s Not Child’s Play: The Online Invasion of Children’s Privacy”
(2006) 3:1 U Ottawa L & Tech J 169 at 174.
22 House of Commons, supra note 16 at 3.
23 Evelyn M Rusli & Douglas MacMillan, “Snapchat Spurned $3 Billion Acquisition Of-
fer from Facebook”, The Wall Street Journal (13 November 2013) online: WSJ
<http://online.wsj.com>. By August 2014, Snapchat’s value had more than tripled:
Evelyn M Rusli & Douglas MacMillan, “Snapchat Fetches $10 Billion Valuation”, The
Wall Street Journal (26 August 2014) online: WSJ <http://online.wsj.com>.
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rejected Facebook’s offer, betting on an opportunity to parlay the information that
the app has collected on its users into targeted advertising revenue and in-app
purchases. The problem with this kind of advertising, however, is that it encourages
companies to collect information of youth deceptively. It depends on the acquies-
cence of youth who do not know any better and employs surreptitious techniques
that avoid drawing attention to their operation. A 2012 study by the US, Federal
Trade Commission discovered that only one in five mobile apps that target kids to
collect their personal information actually posts a privacy policy.24 Some websites
targeted to youth, like Neopets.com, create immersive online environments that
embed advertising directly into the website’s games, blurring the line between con-
tent and advertising.25 Others use vague or technical language26 to avoid explain-
ing to users what is actually quite simple: companies follow them, and they do so
primarily for their own economic benefit. Without the user’s explicit consent, com-
panies effectively deprive the individual of the choice as to whether the benefit of
receiving more relevant advertising is worth the price to his or her privacy.
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has tried to argue that people no longer have
a reasonable expectation of privacy.27 To be fair, what Zuckerberg probably means
is that the world’s embrace of social networks like Facebook reflect a broader
change in people’s attitudes toward privacy, rather than suggesting that any expec-
tation of privacy was obliterated by Facebook’s arrival. Either way, Zuckerberg’s
opinion only serves to justify his own economic interest in the unfettered access to
user data to generate revenue. Again, it attempts to suppress a dialogue with users
as to what their reasonable expectations are and substitutes the answer that “Big
Business” wants.
The economic imperative for companies to collect personal information is also
a political one. In the 1990s, the federal government set out on what was arguably
the largest nation-building exercise since the transcontinental railway and, by the
new millennium, every public school in Canada was connected to the web.28 While
this has had knock-on effects, such as enhancing learning, one of the main drivers
cited for the government initiative was to ensure that Canada remains “competitive
in the . . . information marketplace.”29 Similarly, the purpose of the federal statute
governing commercial organizations’ collection, use, and disclosure of personal in-
formation is: 
. . . to establish, in an era in which technology increasingly facilitates the
circulation and exchange of information, rules to govern the collection, use
and disclosure of personal information in a manner that recognizes the right
of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information and the
24 US, Federal Trade Commission, Mobile Apps for Kids: Disclosures Still Not Making
the Grade (Washington, DC: FTC, December 2012) at 6.
25 John Lawford, All in the Data Family: Children’s Privacy Online (Ottawa: Public In-
terest Advocacy Centre, 2008) at 24, online: PIAC <http://www.piac.ca>.
26 Burkell, Micheti & Steeves, supra note 18 at 18.
27 Bobbie Johnson, “Privacy no longer a social norm, says Facebook founder”, The
Guardian (11 January 2010) online: Guardian Unlimited <http://www.guardian.co.uk>.
28 Burkell, Micheti & Steeves, supra note 18 at 9.
29 Steeves, supra note 21 at 171.
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need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information for
purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the
circumstances.30
The primary legislation governing youth privacy online in Canada thus has a dual
purpose, which reflects the government’s interest in economic growth, and presum-
ably a larger tax base, at the expense of individual privacy over personal informa-
tion. Hence, lawmakers and businesspeople alike have a vested interest in collect-
ing the information of Canadian youth.
(c) Law and History
The law has historically recognized the unique vulnerabilities of youth and
their right to be protected from exploitation. For instance, in the 1989 decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General),31 a
majority of the court upheld Quebec’s prohibitions on advertising to children under
the age of 13 as a reasonable limit on advertisers’ freedom of speech under section
2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In their reasons, the major-
ity held: 
. . . the concerns which have motivated both legislative and voluntary regu-
lation in this area are the particular susceptibility of young children to media
manipulation, their inability to differentiate between reality and fiction and
to grasp the persuasive intention behind the message . . .32
The decision reflects the court’s willingness to treat all children under 13 as a sin-
gle class, despite the fact that some may be more vulnerable to manipulation than
others. More recently, Justice Abella echoed this preference for treating children as
a vulnerable class in society in A.B. (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bragg
Communications Inc.33 Although that case primarily centred on when a party to a
civil proceeding may proceed anonymously, it also addressed the issue of whether
or not a child victim of cyberbullying had to prove that she personally suffered
harm before a court can order a publication ban on the contents of a fake Facebook
profile. Abella J., writing for a unanimous bench, said: 
Recognition of the inherent vulnerability of children has consistent and deep
roots in Canadian law. [. . .] As a result, in an application involving sexual-
ized cyberbullying, there is no need for a particular child to demonstrate that
she personally conforms to this legal paradigm. The law attributes the
heightened vulnerability based on chronology, not temperament.34
In other words, a youth’s age dictates the extent to which the law will treat him as
vulnerable. This, in turn, may affect the way law regards the reasonableness of the
30 PIPEDA, supra note 10, s 3.
31 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), 1989 CarswellQue 115F, 1989 Carswell-
Que 115, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.) [Irwin Toy].
32 Ibid at para 72.
33 A.B. (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2
S.C.R. 567, 2012 CarswellNS 676, 2012 CarswellNS 675 (S.C.C.) [Bragg].
34 Ibid at para 17.
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collection, use, and disclosure of youth’s personal information by commercial
organizations.
A similar approach is routinely applied in criminal law, where the Criminal
Code draws bright lines of liability based on age. Section 13 shields children aged
11 and under from criminal liability either because they are believed to be incapa-
ble of forming the requisite mens rea to be convicted, or because society has de-
cided through its elected representatives that the criminal law is not the appropriate
tool to discipline kids behaving badly.35 Meanwhile, youth aged 12 to 17 may be
charged criminally, but their relative immaturity compared to adults is still recog-
nized by the fact that they fall under the Youth Criminal Justice Act’s separate stat-
utory scheme, which emphasizes rehabilitation over incarceration.36 The YCJA also
protects youth privacy by preventing media from publishing the names of youth
criminals. These provisions reflect the legislature’s intention to diminish the moral
responsibility attached to young offenders based on generalizations about youth of
a particular age, rather than a youth’s particular capacity.
However, notwithstanding the law’s tendency to sometimes group children
into one or more classes based on age, other areas of law take into account the
specific faculties of an individual youth. For instance, in tort law Canadian courts
have adopted a modified test for determining a child’s liability in negligence when
they are above tender age, but below full maturity. The child’s standard of care is
not what any reasonable child of a particular age would do, but what a reasonable
child of like age, intelligence, and experience would have been expected to do in
the circumstances.37 The law of negligence thus considers the unique capacity of
children on a case-by-case basis. Likewise, in health law, the doctrine of the mature
minor declines to lump all minors into a single category based on age. Instead, it
suggests that minors who can demonstrate sufficient maturity to understand the
consequences of consenting to or refusing treatment should have their wishes
respected.38 Here, as with negligence, the law factors the youth’s individual capac-
ity into its analysis, rather than applying general assumptions based on age to
young people as a group. It is within this context — in which the law has opted to
treat all youth in the same way for some purposes and as unique individuals for
other purposes — that approaches to regulating the collection, use, and disclosure
of youth’s personal information online can be understood.
A court’s assessment of youth as a vulnerable class may also be interpreted
through the lens of international law. Article 16 of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child recognizes the right to privacy of children under 18 as a
human right. However, this right should be construed in light of a child’s right to
free expression “through any . . . media of the child’s choice” in Article 13 and
Article 17’s recognition of the important role media plays in ensuring youth can
35 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 13.
36 Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1, s 3 [YCJA].
37 Gerald HL Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at
465.
38 Manitoba (Director of Child & Family Services) v. C. (A.), 2009 CarswellMan 294,
2009 CarswellMan 293, 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.) at para 87 [AC].
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access a diverse range of perspectives.39 In this sense, these provisions support leg-
islation that protects children’s privacy, while appreciating that such protection
should not come at the expense of a child’s choice to express himself through on-
line media that adults believe will undermine youth privacy. From this human
rights perspective, regulating the collection, use, and disclosure of information does
not serve an instrumental purpose to protect youth as consumers. Rather, it recog-
nizes that privacy is inherently worthy of protection for its own sake, balanced
against a youth’s legitimate interest in free expression. Ultimately, online
behavioural advertising and other covert uses of youth’s personal information be-
tray a young person’s autonomy and human dignity. Thus, there is little debate that
youth privacy needs to be safeguarded in the Internet age. The question is how
youth privacy should be regulated and whether the legislative regime currently in
place is effective.
III. PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS ACT
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA)40 is the centrepiece of the federal government’s private-sector privacy
regulation. It purports to protect the personal information of all Canadians, includ-
ing youth, against commercial website operators, among others. The statute has
advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, the law covers a broad spectrum of
personal information. It is flexible enough to take account of the impressionability
of youth and to tailor privacy protections to their particular needs as a class. The
law also promotes transparency in how information is used and respects individual
autonomy by requiring informed consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of
personal information. However, the Privacy Commissioner’s interpretation and ad-
ministration of the Act raises significant concerns about the adequacy of existing
privacy protections for youth online. It is useful to briefly summarize the scheme of
the Act before assessing its strengths and weaknesses.
(a) Statutory Scheme
Although it was enacted in 2000, PIPEDA did not start to govern the collec-
tion, use, and disclosure of personal information by all private organizations in the
course of a commercial transaction, including websites, until 2004.41 Since then,
companies that engage in any of these information practices must comply with the
provisions of the Act. Specifically, section 5(1) requires organizations to obey ten
principles contained in Schedule 1, which constitute national standards for handling
personal information. Of particular relevance to youth privacy are Identifying Pur-
poses, Consent, Limiting Use, and Openness (principles 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, and 4.8, re-
39 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Can TS
1992 No 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990), online: United Nations Treaty Col-
lection <http://untreaty.un.org>.
40 PIPEDA, supra note 10.
41 OPC Guide for Businesses, supra note 6 at 3.
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spectively).42 These principles intersect and overlap. In substance, they require
websites collecting, using, or disclosing personal information about their users or
any other site’s users to explicitly identify the purposes for which the information
will be collected, used, or disclosed and to obtain the user’s knowledge and mean-
ingful consent to gather the information for those purposes. Related to this end,
principle 4.3.2 requires organizations to take “reasonable efforts” to inform the in-
dividual of the purposes to which his information will be put and to state the pur-
poses in a manner such that the user can “reasonably understand” how the informa-
tion will be used.43 Once consent has been obtained, the organization may only use
the information for those stated purposes. If the organization wishes to use the in-
formation for a new purpose, it must seek the user’s renewed consent.44 Under
principle 4.3.6, consent may be express or implied, but implied consent should gen-
erally be reserved for information of a less sensitive nature. Otherwise, there is no
specific requirement for what form consent must take.45
The collection, use, or disclosure of information beyond what is required to
fulfil the explicit purpose cannot be a condition of using the website.46 This rule
discourages sites from collecting more information than necessary. Sites are not
precluded from collecting more information than necessary, but under this principle
users should be allowed to opt out of such practices and still be able to use the
website. Furthermore, section 5(3) of PIPEDA contains an overriding reasonable-
ness requirement. It states that organizations can “collect, use, or disclose personal
information only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider [. . .] appro-
priate in the circumstances.” This means that certain collections, uses, or disclo-
sures of personal information will be against the law, notwithstanding whether or
not an individual user gives consent. Lastly, PIPEDA applies to all Canadians, re-
gardless of age. It makes no special provision for youth privacy online.
The Act is administered by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada who, as an
independent officer of Parliament, reports to the House of Commons and the Sen-
ate.47 The current Commissioner, Daniel Therrien, is responsible for promoting pri-
vacy rights and investigating complaints made under section 11 of PIPEDA. He can
also launch an investigation on his own initiative. The Commissioner issues a re-
port on his findings and makes recommendations to resolve violations of the Act.48
If the organization does not comply, section 14 empowers the Commissioner to
take action in Federal Court, although matters are generally resolved before reach-
ing this stage.
42 PIPEDA, supra note 10, Schedule 1.
43 Ibid, Schedule 1, s 4.3.2.
44 Ibid, Schedule 1, s 4.2.4.
45 Ibid, Schedule 1, s 4.3.7.
46 Ibid, Schedule 1, s 4.3.3.
47 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, About the Office of the Privacy Com-
missioner, online: OPC <http://www.priv.gc.ca>.
48 PIPEDA, supra note 10, s 13.
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(b) Strengths
One of PIPEDA’s greatest strengths in terms of its ability to protect youth
privacy online is that it covers a broad range of personal information. The Act de-
fines “personal information” as any “information about an identifiable individual
. . .”49 This includes not only information that immediately identifies an individual,
like one’s name, address, or Social Insurance Number, but also age, race, religion,
height, weight, marital status, education, email address, IP address, and purchase
history.50 The definition is so wide that it would cover Facebook likes and general
preferences, whether they are tied to a particular person’s name or not. This means
youth who adopt an alternate identity online could still be assured that their per-
sonal information is governed by fair information principles. This is important be-
cause what is or is not “identifying” information is a matter of degree rather than
kind. If enough pieces of information are collected about an individual’s prefer-
ences, they can be used to create a profile of the person who released them, which
may, in turn, be traced back to the individual. Thus, PIPEDA’s definition supports
youth privacy by including virtually all of their information within its scope.
Meanwhile, the statute takes a pragmatic approach to youth privacy online by
accommodating youths’ credulity. Although PIPEDA does not explicitly compel
organizations to treat minors’ personal information differently than that of adults,
the requirement in section 5(3) that personal information may only be collected,
used, or disclosed for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate
is sufficiently flexible to hold websites that collect information from youth to a
higher privacy standard than those that do not. For example, in 2012 the Public
Interest Advocacy Centre filed a complaint against the youth-oriented social net-
work Nexopia.com on the basis that a reasonable person would not consider its
information practices appropriate vis-à-vis youth. Following an investigation, the
Privacy Commissioner at the time, Jennifer Stoddart, agreed with the complainant.
In particular, the Commissioner said that whenever children’s information is in-
volved, what is considered “reasonable” under section 5(3) would change. As a
result, Nexopia’s practice of making all users’ profile information publicly availa-
ble to anyone on the Internet by default was unreasonable.51 The Commissioner’s
finding is significant because she could have easily found that the practice was
inappropriate because young users did not know about the default setting and, con-
sequently, could not meet the “knowledge and consent” requirement of principle
4.3. This was arguably the case, as the Commissioner held that Nexopia’s privacy
policy did not explicitly state the fact that it shared users’ information publicly by
default.52 However, the Commissioner went further, finding that the practice was
inappropriate for young people by virtue of their youth. Assuming users were in-
formed of the public setting and meaningfully consented to this use of their infor-
mation, the Commissioner’s decision suggests that children are nevertheless in
need of protection from future harm that may come from publicly revealing this
49 Ibid, s 2(1).
50 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Interpretation Bulletin, “The Meaning
of ‘Personal Information’” (2 October 2013).
51 OPC, “Nexopia”, supra note 7, Section 1 at paras 92–95, 107.
52 Ibid, Section 1 at para 108.
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information online. The case may be confined to its facts, since the Commissioner
found that the information Nexopia disclosed was highly sensitive data, including
youths’ drug use and sexual activity;53 however, it is not uncommon for youth to
share this kind of personal information online. This signals that the Privacy Com-
missioner will interpret section 5(3) as requiring substantively different safeguards
for youth as a class based on age, even though the statute does not distinguish
explicitly between the privacy needs of adults and youth.
In cases where a reasonable person would consider the collection, use, or dis-
closure of a youth’s personal information appropriate, PIPEDA may still hold web-
sites to a higher standard in dealing with youth. Commenting on the need for
“meaningful consent,” the Privacy Commissioner’s official policy on Online
Behavioural Advertising states: “What is meaningful for a 17-year-old may not be
the same as what is meaningful for a 9-year-old. Practices need to correspond to
cognitive and emotional development. What is appropriate will also depend on the
specific context.”54 At least in theory, this suggests that websites collecting youths’
personal information will need to show that they took reasonable steps to inform
their young users about their data use practices in a way that youth can understand.
Moreover, PIPEDA’s positive requirement that organizations only use infor-
mation for the explicit purposes for which the information is collected promotes
transparency. Youth are less likely to feel that their privacy has been violated if
they are made fully aware of how and why their personal information is being used
in terms that are cognizable to them. This improves the likelihood that youth can
form the requisite consent to the collection and use of their personal information,
enabling them to make a conscious choice as to whether or not the perceived bene-
fit from using the website is worth the privacy trade-off. In addition, the simple fact
that PIPEDA requires organizations to obtain consent from the individuals whose
personal information they seek, as opposed to letting advertisers have free rein to
gather information without notice, enshrines respect for individual autonomy,
which is central to youths’ privacy and their dignity as human beings.55 Therefore,
PIPEDA’s provisions respond to many of the concerns about youth privacy online,
by creating room to adapt its protections to account for young people’s unique
vulnerabilities.
(c) Weaknesses
Notwithstanding the advantages of having a statute with flexibility, PIPEDA
creates too much wiggle room for websites collecting youths’ personal information
for it to effectively defend youth privacy online. Firstly, the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner’s application of the law contradicts its own policy positions. In its
policy on Online Behavioural Advertising from June 2012, the Commissioner ad-
vises that websites should avoid tracking children altogether as a best practice be-
cause “The key issue here is the great difficulty organizations are likely to encoun-
ter in obtaining meaningful consent to OBA from very young users of the
53 Ibid, Section 1 at paras 17–18.
54 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Policy Position on Online Behavioural
Advertising (June 2012), online: OPC <http://www.priv.gc.ca> [OPC, OBA Policy].
55 House of Commons, supra note 16 at 61.
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Internet.”56 In spite of the Commissioner’s suggestion that the reasonableness of an
information practice under section 5(3) is qualitatively different when children are
involved (particularly as it relates to public-by-default settings), the Commissioner
apparently draws the line when it comes to online behavioural advertising. Para-
doxically, even though the OPC suspects youth could not meaningfully consent to
such practices given their complexity, the Commissioner has adopted the position
that tracking users’ Internet traffic across the web can be an appropriate purpose for
collecting, using, and disclosing personal information so long as it is not required
as a condition of service.57 Thus, in the Nexopia investigation, the Privacy Com-
missioner did not recommend that Nexopia stop tracking children, but simply sug-
gested the site should allow them to opt out, which is the same standard that the
Privacy Commissioner applies to the tracking of adults.58 Considering the stealth of
tracking technologies that often deprive users of a conscious choice to share infor-
mation about their surfing habits and the Commissioner’s own admission that youth
will have difficulty in consenting to these practices, it is puzzling how the Commis-
sioner can argue that the reasonableness of using such techniques is unchanged in
the context of youth. The result is an unprincipled patchwork of interpretation that
fails to meaningfully protect youth privacy. It demonstrates PIPEDA’s inability to
give clear notice to website operators as to what uses of youths’ personal informa-
tion will or will not be acceptable.
Secondly, underpinning PIPEDA’s incoherent privacy protections are the stat-
ute’s conflicting purposes. The Federal Court of Appeal considered the Act’s inter-
pretation in Englander v. Telus Communications Inc.59 in which the applicant ar-
gued it was unreasonable for Telus to require a customer’s consent to publish his
information in the company’s white pages and to charge a $2.00 service fee if the
customer later wanted his number unlisted. The court found that this was a reasona-
ble purpose within the meaning of section 5(3), but that Telus had to be more ex-
plicit in notifying customers that their numbers would be published. In contrasting
the goals of the public sector’s Privacy Act with the private sector’s PIPEDA, the
court held: 
The purpose of [PIPEDA] is altogether different. It is undoubtedly directed
at the protection of . . . privacy; but it is also directed at the collection, use
and disclosure of personal information by commercial organizations. It
seeks to ensure that such collection, use and disclosure are made in a man-
ner that reconciles, to the best possible extent, an individual’s privacy with
the needs of the organization. There are, therefore, two competing interests
within the purpose of the [PIPEDA]: an individual’s right to privacy on the
one hand, and the commercial need for access to personal information on
the other. However, there is also an express recognition, by the use of the
56 OPC, OBA Policy, supra note 54.
57 Ibid.
58 OPC, “Nexopia”, supra note 7, Section 3 at paras 59–62.
59 Englander v. Telus Communications Inc., 2004 CarswellNat 5422, 2004 FCA 387,
[2005] 2 F.C.R. 572, 2004 CarswellNat 4119 (F.C.A.).
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words “reasonable purpose,” “appropriate” and “in the circumstances” (re-
peated in subsection 5(3)), that the right of privacy is not absolute.60
In this sense, privacy, far less youth privacy, is not the only or even the main factor
that courts will consider in assessing whether information practices are appropriate.
The Privacy Commissioner adopted a similar stance in a 2009 report responding to
a complaint against Facebook, in which it conceded that since nothing is free and
websites have to pay for the costs of offering their services, collecting users’ infor-
mation to generate advertising revenue is a reasonable condition of using their sites
under section 5(3).61 This may explain why the Privacy Commissioner thinks it is
reasonable for youth to consent to online behavioural advertising (notwithstanding
the inherent challenge of actually obtaining true consent), and unreasonable for
youth to consent to the open disclosure of their information to the public by default.
In one case, the practice makes profit. In the other, there is no obvious financial
benefit. As a result, PIPEDA’s privacy safeguards amount to half-measures. They
operate within a scheme in which privacy is not worthy of protection for its own
sake, but rather privacy is something that must be “reconciled” to the instrumental
objective of economic necessity. Although no right is absolute, the Act as presently
constituted uses privacy as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Conse-
quently, its ability to meaningfully protect youth privacy is inhibited right out of
the gate by conflicting purposes.
Unfortunately, it is not open to youth to challenge the adequacy of this legisla-
tion on the basis that it is not in a child’s best interests; that is, assuming privacy is
in a child’s best interests. In Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth & the Law
v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada found no consensus that laws should al-
ways be in the best interests of the child, so this could not be a principle of funda-
mental justice.62 Accordingly, youth could not succeed in a section 7 Charter chal-
lenge to PIPEDA on the ground that the Act’s infringement of their privacy is not in
their best interests. Assuming a deprivation of privacy engages section 7’s liberty
and security of the person protections, one must prove that the deprivation is also
inconsistent with a principle of fundamental justice before a Charter violation is
found.
Thirdly, the Privacy Commissioner’s administration of PIPEDA in the Nex-
opia investigation may have unintended consequences. Nexopia had argued that,
unlike Facebook, it was an “open” network where users did not merely seek to
communicate with friends but to “show off” to the world. As such, the site’s own-
ers argued that increasing its default privacy settings would flout the reasonable
expectations of its users.63 The Privacy Commissioner did not accept that argu-
60 Ibid at para 38.
61 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA Report of Findings  #2009-
008,  “Complaint  Filed by the  Canadian Internet Policy and  Public Interest Clinic
(CIPPIC) against Facebook Inc” (16 July 2009) at para 131, online: OPC
<http://www.priv.gc.ca>.
62 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth & the Law v. Canada (Attorney General),
2004 CarswellOnt 253, 2004 CarswellOnt 252, 2004 SCC 4, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76
(S.C.C.) at para 10.
63 OPC, “Nexopia”, supra note 7, Section 1 at paras 69–71.
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ment, relying on Nexopia’s privacy policy for evidence, which suggested the site
had more to do with interacting with friends than the public. However, the Com-
missioner was not content to have Nexopia amend its privacy policy to clarify its
public intentions, which would at least bring it in line with principle 4.3.2’s re-
quirement to obtain “knowledge and consent.” She argued that because Nexopia
targeted youth, it was inappropriate to share youths’ personal information publicly
by default under section 5(3).64 This may well have a chilling effect on websites
targeted toward youth. Although the result of the OPC’s report is that youth can
still post information publicly after specifically selecting that option, it creates an
incentive for websites to adopt an “open” network infrastructure where everything
is made public and no privacy options are available so as to avoid any accusation
that its privacy practices are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of its
users. In this sense, Nexopia’s mistake was that it provided optional privacy restric-
tions in the first place. If nothing is private, then there can be no confusion about
what will or will not be shared publicly, which theoretically makes it easier for a
website to satisfy the “knowledge and consent” requirement under the Act. This has
negative repercussions for youth privacy online because youth will sign up for such
“open” networks to express themselves, regardless of whatever the Privacy Com-
missioner thinks is an appropriate level of default privacy vis-à-vis youth. Thus, the
Commissioner’s interpretation of section 5(3) may actually undermine youth pri-
vacy by discouraging sites from implementing optional privacy controls.
Fourthly, PIPEDA does not safeguard against prospective harms that may be
caused by collecting, using, or disclosing youth’s personal information. In Turner
v. Telus Communications Inc.,65 the applicant challenged Telus’ collection of its
employees’ voiceprints for internal network authentication. On appeal, the Federal
Court of Appeal held that the collection was for a reasonable purpose within the
meaning of section 5(3) of PIPEDA. In the course of its judgment, the court noted
that a “reasonable” purpose is to be judged in light of current circumstances. By
contrast, new technologies and uses for personal information are “to be tested only
when they are real and meaningful, not when they are hypothetical.”66 One can
appreciate the court’s desire to judge the reasonableness of collecting, using, and
disclosing personal information without reference to future uses to which that infor-
mation might be put. After all, courts are not fortune-tellers. However, this does not
bode well for youth privacy online. Youth privacy violations are almost certain to
occur as new uses and technologies emerge and, thanks to their ex post facto rea-
soning, courts will be too late to prevent harm. Common sense and the precaution-
ary principle support a conservative approach to youth privacy that evaluates the
reasonableness of a particular collection, use, or disclosure of youths’ personal in-
formation not just in the context of current circumstances, but with a view to possi-
ble future consequences. Anything less risks jeopardizing youth privacy by subject-
ing young people to surveillance for purposes that are only reasonable when one
ignores the risk of future harm.
64 Ibid, Section 1 at paras 110–111.
65 Turner v. Telus Communications Inc., 2007 FCA 21, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 368, 2007 Car-
swellNat 1175, 2007 CarswellNat 172 (F.C.A.).
66 Ibid at para 15.
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Fifthly, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner lacks sufficient power to cur-
tail youth privacy violations. The Commissioner makes recommendations and can
apply to Federal Court to enforce those recommendations as an order of the court,
but that process is both cumbersome and rarely used. The Nexopia investigation is
a prime example of the Commissioner’s deficiencies: Nexopia refused to follow 4
of 24 recommendations to comply with PIPEDA.67 When the Privacy Commis-
sioner sought to have the outstanding recommendations enforced in court, the own-
ers sold the company. The new owners promised to make all changes by April 30,
2013; however, almost four years have passed since the complaint was filed and the
OPC has yet to confirm whether all of its recommendations have been imple-
mented.68 Simply put, the Commissioner lacks the teeth it needs to enforce the Act.
Related to the Commissioner’s lack of enforcement power, the Act unduly burdens
youth with the defence of their privacy. Although the Commissioner may audit the
information management practices of websites on its own initiative, it is principally
a complaint-driven body. As a result, PIPEDA places the onus on youth who feel
that their privacy has been violated online — for example because a site failed to
disclose a particular use of personal information or used it without consent — to
take legal action against the company or else file a formal complaint with the
Commissioner.69
Perhaps due to its lack of enforcement power, the OPC also appears to be too
quick to defer to the practices of private organizations. Where an organization gives
reasonable notice, it seems the Commissioner is willing to impute consent to the
user. For example, in the Nexopia investigation, the Commissioner specifically
noted the absence of pop-ups, click-through agreements, or help icons on the site as
evidence that users may not have meaningfully consented to certain collections,
uses, or disclosures of their personal information. When the site agreed to adopt
these particular mechanisms, the Commissioner found this to satisfy its concern
over obtaining consent.70 The problem with these suggestions is that they are
merely technical fixes to a nuanced problem. None ensure meaningful consent. No-
tices or pop-ups draw attention to an issue, but most youth do not read them be-
cause they are considered “long and boring.”71 Even if they do read them, they
often do not understand.72 In this way, the Commissioner’s version of what will
constitute consent resembles notice, rather than actual informed consent in the
sense that an individual youth user appreciates the nature and consequences of
sharing his private information online.
Lastly, it is not clear what will count as informed consent under the law be-
cause consent has not been defined. Must one understand not simply that his or her
information is being used for marketing, but also every technical detail as to how
67 OPC, “Nexopia”, supra note 7, Summary of Conclusions at para 6.
68 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report to Parliament 2012:
Privacy and Your Reputation — Who Shapes Your Identity Online? (Ottawa: OPC,
2013) at 18.
69 PIPEDA, supra note 10, s 11.
70 OPC, “Nexopia”, supra note 7, Section 2 at paras 35 71, 74, 76.
71 Steeves, supra note 21 at 181.
72 Burkell, Micheti & Steeves, supra note 18 at 7.
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the information is transmitted to accomplish that purpose? This is unlikely. How-
ever, using vague language that covers the kind of collection, use, or disclosure
being employed has also been found to be inadequate.73 The uncertainty of where
along this spectrum meaningful consent will fall undermines respect for youths’
informed privacy choices. In fact, it is uncertain whether or not youth can legally
consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information at all.
Principle 4.3 of PIPEDA requires knowledge and consent of the individual “except
where inappropriate.” The accompanying note in the Act suggests that it may be
“impossible or inappropriate” to obtain consent when the individual is a minor.74
At first glance, this would seem to create a loophole by which websites could col-
lect youths’ personal information without the need for consent. Complicating mat-
ters is the fact that youth under the age of 18 are also under a general incapacity to
enter into contracts. A minor’s parent or guardian is typically required to make
decisions on the child’s behalf.75 This is consistent with the Privacy Commis-
sioner’s Guide for Businesses, which recommends that organizations obtain con-
sent from a legal guardian.76 However, it is inconsistent with the Privacy Commis-
sioner’s findings from the Nexopia investigation. In that report, the Commissioner
said that websites should not focus on obtaining parental consent, but concentrate
on obtaining the end user’s consent instead: 
. . . there may be value in young users involving their parents in their online
interactions, [but] the Act does not require the parents of all minors to con-
sent to the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. Organiza-
tions who handle youths’ personal information must explain their informa-
tion handling practices in such a manner that youth can reasonably
understand how their personal information will be used or disclosed. Ac-
cordingly, we have addressed issues relating to age and consent pursuant to
this requirement.77
By sidestepping the issue of parents’ role in supervising their children’s online
activities, the Privacy Commissioner implicitly acknowledges the practical diffi-
culty of obtaining verifiable parental consent. Yet, at the same time, the Commis-
sioner’s emphasis on securing the consent of the individual youth directly contra-
dicts testimony she gave in Parliament, where she openly doubted whether children
could provide meaningful consent under PIPEDA at all.78 It is ambiguous whether
companies actually need consent to collect, use, or disclose a minor’s personal in-
formation under PIPEDA and, if so, whether consent can or should be obtained
from the parent or child. In the absence of greater clarity, websites will be able to
skirt the rules and intrusions into youth privacy online will go unchecked. There-
fore, the administration and interpretation of PIPEDA by the Privacy Commis-
sioner and the courts raise serious concerns about the effectiveness of existing leg-
islative protections for youth privacy online, and have elicited calls for reform.
73 Ibid at 61.
74 PIPEDA, supra note 10, Schedule 1, s 4.3.
75 Lawford, supra note 25 at 48.
76 OPC, Guide for Businesses, supra note 6 at 9.
77 OPC, “Nexopia”, supra note 7, Section 2 at para 70.
78 House of Commons, supra note 16 at 98.
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED REFORMS
The current law’s ineffectiveness at protecting youth privacy online has led
many to propose legislative reform. Unfortunately, these proposals are marred by
their own problems, namely the fact that they operate within PIPEDA’s consent-
oriented paradigm and fall victim to the same characteristic flaws of that system.
The obsession with obtaining consent has reduced youth privacy online to a meta-
phorical (and, in some cases, literal) checkbox that websites need to get ticked,
which misses the goal of privacy rights: to give users control over how their per-
sonal information is collected, used, and disclosed.
(a) Bill C-12
Section 29 of PIPEDA requires Parliament to review the Act every five years
and propose changes as needed. The first round of review began in 2006, and on
September 29, 2011 the federal government introduced Bill C-12 in the House of
Commons, which would have been known as the Safeguarding Canadians’ Per-
sonal Information Act.79 The bill never made it to second reading and has not been
reintroduced since the Prime Minister prorogued Parliament in September 2013. In
response to concerns that PIPEDA did not sufficiently protect children’s privacy,
Bill C-12 would have amended PIPEDA to specify “. . . the consent of an indivi-
dual is only valid if it is reasonable to expect that the individual understands the
nature, purpose and consequences of the collection, use or disclosure of personal
information to which they are consenting.”80 Industry Canada suggested this defini-
tion was chosen specifically because it would make obtaining the consent required
to collect information from children more difficult.81 In reality, however, this defi-
nition does not appear to add anything to PIPEDA’s existing requirement for mean-
ingful consent. It simply makes explicit what the Privacy Commissioner already
knows, which is that what constitutes meaningful consent for an adult may not be
meaningful consent for a youth. The problem is that, even if Parliament adopted
Bill C-12’s definition, it does nothing to clarify whether parents can give consent
on their child’s behalf under PIPEDA, or whether the Privacy Commissioner’s em-
phasis on obtaining the consent of the youth directly should be determinative. Fur-
thermore, the definition cheapens youth privacy protections by infusing an objec-
tive analysis of whether it is “reasonable” to expect an individual to understand the
nature, purpose, and consequences of the collection, rather than asking whether a
particular youth or parent subjectively consented to the collection. Since privacy is
inherently personal, its protection should not be dependent on an objective stan-
dard. Thus, Bill C-12 offers a technical fix to PIPEDA’s anaemic protections for
youth privacy that (a) arguably does not help youth privacy and (b) fails to solve
problems associated with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.
79 Bill C-12, An Act to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Docu-
ments Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011 (first reading 29 September 2011).
80 Ibid, cl 5.
81 House of Commons, supra note 16 at 22.
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(b) Bill C-475
The Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics con-
sidered this latter problem in a 2012 study into the privacy practices of social media
websites and heard testimony from companies including Facebook, Google, Nex-
opia, and Twitter. The committee issued a report in April 2013 titled Privacy and
Social Media in the Age of Big Data.82 As a result of that report, NDP committee
member Charmaine Borg tabled a private member’s bill, Bill C-475,83 to enhance
the Privacy Commissioner’s enforcement powers. In particular, the bill would have
given the Commissioner the power to make orders with the force of law and make
it mandatory for all organizations to report data breaches.84 This would greatly im-
prove the Commissioner’s ability to police and, if need be, punish website opera-
tors that violate youth privacy by forcing them to align with PIPEDA’s require-
ments. Still, two points are worth mentioning. First, opposition private members’
bills are notoriously unsuccessful at winning Parliament’s approval. Bill C-475 be-
gan second reading in May 2013 and, although it was reinstated after prorogation,
the bill was ultimately defeated.85 Second, these reforms do nothing to address the
challenges with PIPEDA itself; they merely make it easier for the Privacy Commis-
sioner to enforce a flawed statute. The issues of whether a minor can meaningfully
consent and what counts as a reasonable use of youths’ personal information re-
main unanswered. Hence, strengthening the Privacy Commissioner’s powers,
though desirable, does not address the underlying youth privacy challenge created
by an equivocal legislative regime.
(c) Quebec’s Consumer Protection Model
One way to bring clarity to the law on youth privacy online would be to adopt
a model similar to the one Quebec has used for protecting children as consumers.
That province’s Consumer Protection Act has banned advertising to children under
13 with a few exceptions since the 1970s.86 Irwin Toy challenged the constitution-
ality of the prohibition on the ground that it violated the company’s freedom of
expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada
agreed, but found that the limit was reasonable because other more minimally im-
pairing means would not accomplish the objective of protecting children from ex-
ploitation by advertisers as effectively.87 Although that case was decided in the
context of consumer protection, a similar approach can be applied to youth privacy
online. For instance, Valerie Steeves, a professor at the University of Ottawa, has
82 Ibid.
83 Bill C-475, An Act to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Doc-
uments Act (order-making power), 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2013 (first reading 26 February
2013).
84 Ibid, cls 1(2), 2.
85 Bill C-475, An Act to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Doc-
uments Act (order-making power), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014 (defeated by the House of
Commons 29 January 2014).
86 Consumer Protection Act, RSQ, c P-40.1, ss 248–249.
87 Irwin Toy, supra note 31 at para 88.
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argued that banning websites from collecting, using, and disclosing personal infor-
mation of youth below a certain age “may be the best way to protect kids from
invasive online practices.”88 Steeves’ position is driven by a concern about the ad-
verse effects of surveillance in general. Under PIPEDA, no child is too young for a
website to collect his or her information so long as the site obtains meaningful
consent to the purposes for which the information is being collected. Since ques-
tions about the capacity to meaningfully consent most often arise with preteens, the
Quebec model suggests that the only effective solution to safeguard youth privacy
online is to prohibit websites from collecting their information at all. The problem
with this blanket approach is that by instructing websites on what they cannot do, it
inadvertently restricts what young people can do. In effect, this undermines youth
privacy by denying youth a space to express themselves, often away from the pry-
ing eyes of parents. As one 17-year-old put it: “. . . I think privacy is more just you
choosing what you want to keep to yourself. [. . .] And so I don’t think that
Facebook is violating privacy. I think it’s letting people choose how they want to
define privacy.”89 In other words, a prohibition model would deprive a whole
group of youth of the choice to share their information online, not because they are
each incapable of consenting to that choice, but because of assumptions attached to
their age.
One might argue that the prohibition would only target commercial websites
which have an economic interest in exploiting children’s personal information for
profit. Non-profit or government-operated websites could pop up to fill the void left
by the ban and still allow youth to express themselves online.90 This is true, but it
misses the point: if youth online privacy is about choosing to share or not share
personal information about oneself and thereby controlling what details are public
and private, then it also assumes the right to choose with whom, on what platform,
and on what terms (i.e. commercial or otherwise) a young person discloses that
information. Therefore, shuttering online access for youth is as much a violation of
their privacy as unauthorized uses of their personal information. In both cases,
youth lose control based on generalized assumptions about their (in)ability to
meaningfully consent to sharing their personal information online.
(d) The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
In the United States, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)91
governs young people’s privacy online. COPPA is distinct from PIPEDA in two
important respects: first, the statute is specifically about children’s privacy; and,
second, it is specifically about privacy in an online context. Some advocates, in-
cluding the federal NDP caucus, argue that Canada should adopt the Americans’
approach of enacting online- and child-specific legislation to improve youth pri-
vacy protections.92 However, one should not assume that child-specific legislation
88 Steeves, supra note 21 at 188.
89 Boyd & Marwick, supra note 14 at 11.
90 Richard, supra note 11 at 16.
91 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 USC §6501–6506 (1998) [COPPA].
92 House of Commons, supra note 16 at 98.
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is inherently better than PIPEDA’s universal approach. The COPPA Rule requires
website operators that target children or knowingly collect information from chil-
dren under the age of 13 to first obtain “verifiable” parental consent prior to col-
lecting the child’s information online.93 The US Federal Trade Commission, which
administers the Act, has indicated that it will require a more reliable form of paren-
tal consent for websites that disclose children’s information to third parties, thereby
exposing children to greater risk of harm, than for those that advertise to youth
without transferring their users’ personal information.94 Unlike the Quebec model,
COPPA facilitates rather than prohibits the collection of personal information from
youth under 13. This also means that, unlike PIPEDA where it is not clear if very
young children or their parents could ever meaningfully consent to the collection of
the child’s personal information, COPPA puts the power squarely in parents’ hands
with one exception: COPPA does not require consent to collect the information of
users aged 13 to 18. This renders teens vulnerable to unsolicited tracking and min-
ing of their personal data.
The greatest problem with legislating custom privacy rules for youth is that it
inevitably forces drafters into drawing bright lines based on age, which are virtually
impossible to enforce. The American experience is instructive in this regard. In
theory, Congress decided that youth under 13 were at a greater risk of harm to their
online privacy and thus required the added safeguard of parental consent. In prac-
tice, many websites in the US have responded by not accepting users under 13 to
avoid the added cost and difficulty of verifying consent.95 For example, Facebook
deletes approximately 20,000 accounts registered by users aged 12 and under every
day.96 This highlights how easy it is to lie about one’s birthdate to circumvent the
age restriction. It also means that, contrary to COPPA’s intention, websites are rou-
tinely collecting and selling personal information of youth younger than 13 without
seeking parental consent.97 Therefore, creating one set of online privacy rules for
youth and a separate regime for adults has unintended consequences for youth pri-
vacy. Moreover, it jeopardizes youth privacy in the same way as the Quebec prohi-
bition model in that it has the effect of shutting out the class of youth to whom a
more stringent set of rules apply. As already discussed, denying youth access to
commercial websites impinges on youths’ ability to control who they share their
information with, undermining youths’ privacy online.
93 COPPA, supra note 91, §6502.
94 US, Federal Trade Commission, Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions
(July 2013) at H4, online: FTC <http://business.ftc.gov>.
95 Danah Boyd et al, “Why Parents Help Their Children Lie to Facebook About Age:
Unintended Consequences of the ‘Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act’”, online:
(2011) 16:11 First Monday 1 <http://www.firstmonday.org>.
96 Michael Oliveira, “Facebook has mulled opening social network to preteens”, The
Globe and Mail (20 October 2013) online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
97 Boyd et al, supra note 95.
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(e) The Mature Minor
The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) argues that privacy law ought to
import the doctrine of the mature minor from the medical context. In Manitoba
(Director of Child & Family Services) v. C. (A.), the Supreme Court considered an
appeal from a decision ordering a 14-year-old Jehovah’s Witness to receive life-
saving blood transfusions that she refused on religious grounds. The statutory pre-
sumption that it was in the “best interests” of minors 16 and older to defer to their
wishes was upheld. However, the court also developed the concept of the “mature”
minor: a child below the age of 16 who can appreciate the nature and consequences
of a medical decision. According to the court’s judgment, it is in a child’s best
interests that his or her views are increasingly determinative as maturity in-
creases.98 AC stands for the proposition that children have a right to a hearing
before a judge to determine their relative maturity and whether they can appreciate
the nature of the medical intervention.99 PIAC suggests that a lower standard than
the mature minor should be applied to youths’ ability to consent to the collection of
their personal information online because the latter is not a life or death situa-
tion.100 Table 1 summarizes the group’s proposal:
Table 1: Public Interest Advocacy Centre’s Proposed Consent
Requirements for the Collection, Use & Disclosure of Minors’ Personal
Information Online101
Age Consent Disclosure to third parties
allowed?
12 and under Ban on collecting personal information
13 to 15 Teen + Parent No
16 to age of majority Teen Yes, but need Teen + Parent
to opt in
PIAC also suggests that websites should be compelled to purge all data col-
lected from a youth upon reaching the age of majority unless the individual ex-
pressly allows the website to continue storing the information collected during his
or her minority.102 The result is a consent matrix consisting of varying demands on
children and parents based on age. By instituting a graduated scheme of consent,
the proposal recognizes a youth’s greater maturity and independence as he or she
increases in age. It also balances a youth’s presumed level of maturity with checks
on how their information can be used by websites, with disclosure to third parties
demanding extra protection as the risk of information falling into the wrong hands
increases.
98 AC, supra note 38 at para 116.
99 Ibid at paras. 114–115.
100 Lawford, supra note 25 at 72.
101 Ibid at 69–70.
102 Ibid at 72–73.
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Despite PIAC’s argument that a standard lower than the mature minor is desir-
able in the privacy context, the truth is that even if the mature minor was a more
appropriate standard it would not be practical to administer. Society could not rea-
sonably expect a youth to appear before a judge or some other administrative body
to have his level of maturity assessed every time he wants to sign up for a new
commercial website that has its own unique information management practices.
Yet, in a perfect world, this would be the ideal solution to the challenge of respect-
ing an individual’s autonomy while ensuring the individual’s privacy is protected
by judging his ability to provide meaningful consent. It would be more minimally
impairing to one’s privacy and autonomy by tailoring prohibitions on web access
and information disclosure to the unique developmental stage of each particular
youth. However, privacy law should not try to approximate this tailoring based on
arbitrary categories of age. In his dissent in AC, Binnie J. applied the constitutional
test for arbitrariness, concluding: 
. . . the limit (i.e. the irrebuttable presumption [that youth below a certain
age cannot consent to medical treatment]) when applied to young persons of
capacity has “no real relation” to the legislative goal of protecting children
who lack such capacity. The deprivation in the case of mature minors (a
class to which A.C. belongs) is arbitrary, and the deprivation therefore vio-
lates s. 7.103
Binnie J. went on to find that the infringement of liberty and security of the
person under section 7 of the Charter was disproportionate and not justified under
section 1. The Justice’s comments could be equally applied to PIAC’s proposal that
draws bright lines as to who can or cannot consent to the collection, use, or disclo-
sure of their personal information. This prevents children who fall into one of these
restricted age categories, but who are nevertheless capable of providing meaningful
consent, from negotiating the boundaries of their privacy online. Abella J., writing
for the majority, did not think the statute violated section 7 of the Charter because
the “best interests” of children under 16 could also be construed as giving these
youth the right to appear before a judge to prove they are sufficiently mature to
make their own medical decisions. However, she agreed with Binnie J. that, in the
absence of a hearing, it would be arbitrary to assume no one under 16 would ever
have the capacity to grant or withhold consent to medical treatment.104 In this way,
by narrowly focusing on issues of age and consent, PIAC’s proposal for reform
makes arbitrary assumptions about the developmental capacity of youth. It will trap
relatively mature youth in its rigid categories. Hence, as with defining consent
under PIPEDA, strengthening the powers of the Privacy Commissioner, banning
the collection of information from youth under 13, and COPPA’s separate privacy
rules for children, PIAC’s proposal usurps youths’ own control over their private
information, which is inconsistent with youths’ positive conception of their right to
privacy online.
103 AC, supra note 38 at para 223 [emphasis added].
104 Ibid at paras 107–108.
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V. THE WAY FORWARD
The law has a role to play in protecting youth privacy online. The solution is
not to lump all youth into categories based on assumptions about what they can or
cannot consent to and then to deny them access to the tools they increasingly de-
pend on for self-expression and discovery. Any answer depends on recognizing that
the problem of youth privacy online is not a problem exclusive to youth. Two-
thirds of adults who think website privacy policies are easy to understand also in-
correctly believe that those sites will not share their information.105 As already dis-
cussed, attempts to legislate child-specific privacy rules only serve to alienate
youth from the online discussion. In the name of “protecting” youth from the evils
of sharing personal information online, society might strip youth of the social me-
dia tools through which youth mediate their privacy. Simply put, youth privacy
does not need protection if there is no privacy to be had. For reasons already men-
tioned, borrowing the doctrine of the mature minor from health law would be an
ideal model to balance society’s legitimate interest in protecting vulnerable chil-
dren, while allowing mature youth to make their own choices about what informa-
tion to share online. However, individualized assessment by a third party is not
practical. Meanwhile, COPPA gives parents a say over whether their children under
13 can consent to collections of personal information, but seems to shut parents out
of the decision-making for children 13 and older.
For all of these reasons, youth will experience privacy on the Internet most
meaningfully when the decision to share personal information with commercial
websites is made by youth themselves in conjunction with their parents. The law
must give youth and parents the tools they need in order to manage a child’s pri-
vacy online. These tools must be built into the systems architecture of all websites
that collect, use, or disclose personal information, regardless of whether that infor-
mation belongs to youth or adults. What is needed is nothing less than a privacy
revolution: a change in how society does business and in how it conceives of the
personal information people share. Only when society sees personal information as
a birthright, rather than a commodity, will privacy be meaningfully respected. A
multi-layered approach with a strong emphasis on education, supported by law, will
be necessary to realize this goal.
(a) Privacy by Design
Instead of fretting over whether or not a certain collection, use, or disclosure
of personal information is “reasonable” in the context of children, legislation
should mandate that all commercial websites embed privacy protections into their
systems. The former Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Ann
Cavoukian, calls this “Privacy by Design” because it encourages developers to de-
sign their websites in a manner that has privacy in mind from conception to deliv-
ery.106 Since privacy will be embedded into the web’s architecture, adults and
youth will benefit equally from its protections and youth will not be denied access
to avoid compliance with a separate regulatory regime.
105 Steeves, supra note 21 at 182.
106 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy By Design: Take the Challenge (Toronto: Information and
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 2009) at iv.
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Such a mandate will likely attract opposition. For instance, as of October
2013, Facebook’s default sharing settings for users between the ages of 13 and 18
is “Friends Only,” as opposed to the broader “Friends of Friends” or “Public” set-
tings.107 Similarly, in September 2013 the Digital Advertising Alliance of Canada
(DAAC) launched the Canadian Self-Regulatory Program for Online Behavioural
Advertising. The program allows consumers to opt out of behavioural tracking by
participating advertisers.108 One can imagine companies lining up to argue that leg-
islated privacy requirements are unnecessary because these organizations already
provide means to protect user privacy. However, the problem with these self-regu-
latory approaches is that there is no way to guarantee compliance, and in both ex-
amples the companies only implemented these changes recently. Even then,
Facebook and DAAC arguably only did so because they saw an economic advan-
tage to improving youth privacy as a means to boost the confidence of its youth
customers and their parents. It is not difficult to imagine an alternate scenario in
which companies did not afford the same protections to youth so as to preserve
profitability.
Privacy by Design does not mean all websites would have to adopt a “closed”
network where all information is private by default. Rather, the expectation would
be that all websites provide comprehensive and detailed privacy mechanisms that
allow people to easily opt in or opt out of one or more purposes for which a website
collects, uses, or discloses personal information. This would avoid the risks of “im-
plied” consent when consent, as a matter of fact, was not actually present in the
youth or parent. Websites may already voluntarily allow this to varying degrees,
but under this proposal the law could require websites to list all purposes in one
place and the choice to opt out would be available for each of these purposes indi-
vidually. Websites could still list some purposes as conditions of service, in which
case users should be notified that their account would be deleted if they want to opt
out of those discrete uses. Importantly, these conditions would be transparent and
could be revisited, instead of relying on one box ticked at registration. User control
would become the default expectation among all users no matter what their age,
using privacy as a lens through which the structural design of a website is assessed.
One might criticize this approach, as I have earlier in this article, on the basis
that it is a technical solution to a deeper societal problem. As Cavoukian argues,
however, technology is inherently neutral.109 Even as it threatens privacy, new
technologies can also be used to enhance privacy. In her 2011 Annual Report to
Parliament on PIPEDA, the federal Privacy Commissioner suggested “many of the
problems with [Nexopia] could have been avoided if only privacy considerations
had been taken into account back when the operation was being designed and
107 Alexei Oreskovic, “Facebook lifts restriction on teen users sharing with public”, The
Globe and Mail (16 October 2013) online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
108 Digital Advertising Alliance of Canada, Self-Regulatory Program For Online
Behavioural Advertising, online: DAAC <http://www.youradchoices.ca>.
109 Cavoukian, supra note 106 at iv.
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launched.”110 If websites routinely implement privacy controls by design (and,
under this proposal, by law), youth and their parents will be better equipped to
avoid privacy intrusions.
(b) Parents as Judges
The thought of parents as judges of their child’s best interests is enough to
strike fear into the hearts of many teenagers. But it is unlikely parents will force a
mass exodus of youth from the Internet. In fact, an American study has shown that
parents are often complicit in allowing their children to register for websites like
Facebook below the 13-year-old cut-off. Sixty-eight percent of parents admitted
that they helped their underage child create a Facebook account and three out of
every four of these parents knew that their child was registering against the site’s
rules. Moreover, 93% of all parents believe they should have the final say when it
comes to regulating their child’s web use.111 These numbers might be lower in the
Canadian context, adjusting for a more deferential political culture; but there is no
reason to suspect that a substantial majority of Canadian parents would not also
prefer to have a greater influence on their children’s online activities. Witnesses at
the Privacy Committee’s study of social networks emphasized the need for parents
to play a greater role in protecting their children online.112 Clearly, there is a dis-
connect between the Privacy Commissioner’s interpretation of PIPEDA, which
could have the effect of restricting access for youth based on a perceived incapacity
to meaningfully consent, and the role of parents in deciding what is appropriate for
their child.
In the absence of judges assessing the relative maturity of youth and their ca-
pacity to consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information,
parents are a natural alternative to make that determination. To the extent possible,
this proposal avoids intruding on the privacy rights of mature youth who might
otherwise lose control over what information they can share online due to attrib-
uted, rather than actual, assumptions about their capacity. Youth are not naı̈ve.
When they share personal information online, they do so as part of a calculated
analysis based on risk and reward.113 Furthermore, youth adopt social strategies to
manage their privacy online, such as speaking in code to reach their intended audi-
ence, while leaving parents or advertisers in the dark.114 It is always possible that
parents will not let their child share information online, even if he or she is mature,
but this is already true under PIPEDA. The law should not force parents to let their
sons or daughters use Facebook, but it should be open to them to determine, in
consultation with their children, whether it is appropriate for their children to share
110 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report to Parliament 2011:
Privacy for Everyone (Ottawa: OPC, June 2012) at 2 [emphasis added].
111 Boyd et al, supra note 95.
112 House of Commons, supra note 16 at 23.
113 Matthew Johnson, “From Protection to Empowerment: Reframing the Conversation on
Youth Privacy Education” (Paper delivered at the Insights on Privacy Speaker Series, 8
September 2011), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca>.
114 Boyd & Marwick, supra note 14 at 18.
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personal information online and, using the tools that would be required under a
Privacy by Design law, to choose what purposes are acceptable to them.
One might argue it is unfair to expect parents to give informed consent to the
collection of their child’s information when privacy policies and terms of service
are too complex for the average person to understand, far less to expect “mature”
children to make that decision themselves. So the theory goes: modern western de-
mocracies have laws made by a professional class of legislators because a division
of labour in society is most efficient. Citizens should defer to the legislature to
make decisions and pass laws that prevent harm to society because policy issues are
too complex for the average layperson — who is too preoccupied by personal af-
fairs to be able to learn about the myriad ways in which personal information is
collected, used, and disclosed by private organizations — to make an informed
choice. The problem with this argument, however, is that it sidesteps the fact that
adults are already expected to make decisions about their own privacy. Are
lawmakers to establish tribunals to assess whether every adult has the capacity to
understand the intricate information practices of the private sector every time one
wants to sign up for a new website? Such a suggestion is both absurd and impracti-
cal as it ignores the important role for individual autonomy in making important
choices.
A further objection can be made that giving discretion to youth and their par-
ents to decide when it is appropriate for a youth to share personal information will
harm children. Admittedly, this approach does not protect youth or their parents
from underestimating the potential consequences of revealing youths’ information
online. It does not stop people from making poor choices. However, this is not
necessarily a bad thing. For example, Canadian youth who reported having had a
bad experience on Facebook were found to be more likely to control their informa-
tion through the site’s privacy settings.115 In other words, there is something to be
gained from allowing youth to experiment with their privacy online, to make mis-
takes, and to learn from them. One can tell a child not to touch the stove, but some
children will not listen until they burn themselves. Denying youth this opportunity
does a disservice to them. It is more harmful to act as though the law can solve all
of society’s ills when it cannot because, when Parliament does legislate and unin-
tended consequences occur, the public loses confidence in the legal system. The
solution to this dilemma is not to legally block youth from accessing websites that
collect their information. Governments should focus on educating youth about the
risks of sharing personal information online and use the law to give them the tools
necessary to make privacy choices that work for them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Youth privacy online exists in a context where society has an interest in sur-
veillance and technology makes it easier than ever before to collect, use, and dis-
115 Emily Christofides, Amy Muise & Serge Desmarais, Privacy and Disclosure on
Facebook: Youth and Adults’ Information Disclosure and Perceptions of Privacy Risks
(26 March 2010) at 8, online: University of Guelph
<http://www.psychology.uoguelph.ca/faculty/desmarais/files/OPC_Final_Report-
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close personal data. The economic benefits of tapping into the youth market have
led commercial websites to track youths’ online activity and exploit that informa-
tion for private gain. Governments have been complicit in fostering a legal environ-
ment in which the commoditization of youths’ personal information can continue.
In some cases, the law has attributed vulnerability to youth as a class based on age,
while in others it has considered the developmental capacity of each individual mi-
nor. Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act sup-
ports youth privacy online by taking a broad approach to defining what personal
information it will cover. PIPEDA requires websites to be honest about their rea-
sons for collecting personal information and the statute is flexible enough to hold
youth and adults to different standards, recognizing youths’ particular vulnerability.
On the other hand, the Act’s competing purposes of facilitating economic growth
and protecting individual privacy have led the Privacy Commissioner to give spe-
cial protection to youth in some instances and the same protection as adults in
others. The Privacy Commissioner lacks effective powers to enforce the law and
has failed to clarify whether parents’ or children’s voices are determinative in de-
ciding who can or should be the one to “meaningfully consent” to the collection,
use, or disclosure of a minor’s personal information.
Unfortunately, many of the proposed reforms are preoccupied with ages of
consent, a focus that paints all youth with a single brush. Prohibiting the collection
of personal information from youth under 13 or child-specific legislation like
COPPA in the US have the practical effect of denying youth access to commercial
websites upon which they depend to express their identities. Youth experience pri-
vacy intrusions not only in a negative sense (e.g. a website collecting personal in-
formation without consent), but also in a positive sense (e.g. being deprived of the
choice or preferred means of communicating personal information). In both cases,
they lose control. The model of the mature minor would be an ideal way to moder-
ate youth privacy online, but it would be impractical to administer. PIAC’s alterna-
tive, a graduated matrix of consent requirements based on what it believes is appro-
priate for youth of a particular age, is not minimally impairing of youths’ privacy
interests. It would prevent youth who are mature enough to manage their own pri-
vacy from participating in the online community. As a result, it falls onto the shoul-
ders of parents to decide what is appropriate for their child. This approach tailors
privacy to the individual youth, instead of lumping all children together based on
generalized assumptions about capacity. With a robust educational strategy and a
legislative framework that emphasizes Privacy by Design, youth and parents will
make choices that respect their own privacy, which is inherently personal and
should not be constrained based on membership in a particular class. The common
plea among youth advocates is always to “think of the children.” But in thinking
about the children, legislators would be wise to not forget the child. 
